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Abstract 
As a result of increased globalisation and digitalisation, new security challenges 
emerge such as the rise of online disinformation which undermines democracy and 
people’s trust in mainstream media and public authorities. The 2016 United States 
presidential elections, the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the 2017 
French presidential elections have all been disturbed by external interference coming 
from Russia, including massive disinformation campaigns which were disseminated on 
social media to influence citizens’ opinion. This paper studies the European Union’s 
(EU) strategy to counter external disinformation campaigns in cyberspace, i.e. the 
campaigns that are diffused online by foreign actors, such as Russia, within the EU’s 
territory. To what extent is the EU strategically prepared to counter external 
disinformation campaigns in cyberspace? 
 
The EU has adopted a defensive strategy to deal with disinformation. It has delivered 
several strategic documents, including an Action Plan in December 2018, that 
provides a promising basis for action. The work done by the East StratCom Task Force, 
which detects and debunks Russian narratives, is a strong asset for the EU. The major 
online platforms are currently trying to implement a Code of Practice that the 
European Commission has set up with the aim of curbing disinformation spreading on 
social networks. Having a long-term perspective in mind, the EU rightly implements 
measures to enhance societal resilience and improve media literacy among its 
citizens. However, the financial resources dedicated to counter disinformation are not 
commensurate with the threat it represents. Furthermore, the EU’s approach is not 
focusing enough on artificial intelligence tools that can significantly influence how 
disinformation is carried out and disseminated but can, on the other hand, also help 
fact-checking activities. Hence, the EU is not entirely prepared to counter external 
disinformation campaigns in cyberspace. Moreover, disinformation should be looked 
at in the wider framework of hybrid warfare and should therefore be considered as a 
cybersecurity matter.  
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Introduction: the EU and the new information warfare 
According to a recent study, “the majority of people in advanced economies will see 
more false than true information”1 by 2022, a worrying prediction that gives us pause 
for thought about the information society we are living in. Laptops, smartphones, 
tablets give us the opportunity to be aware at any time of what is happening around 
the globe. Social media allow us to communicate freely with people all over the world. 
We are thus constantly surrounded by a flow of information. The technological 
progress that we are witnessing in the 21st century highlights a paradox: our societies 
are becoming more interconnected, but are at the same time confronted with a 
number of challenges, disinformation being one of them.  
 
Disinformation is not a new phenomenon. It is at least “as old as the printing press”.2 
However, technological development and social media have tremendously 
accelerated the speed at which news, and in this case, false news, are diffused and 
have expanded their reach. Disinformation is a virulent trend that concerns all citizens 
and all sectors of democratic societies.  
 
Moreover, external interference in national elections or referendums, involving massive 
disinformation campaigns, seems to have become the ‘new normal’. The 2016 Brexit 
referendum, the 2016 US presidential elections and the 2017 French presidential 
elections have something in common: they all have been disturbed to a certain extent 
by the meddling of Russia in the political debates. Indeed, Russia uses disinformation 
as a weapon in its hybrid warfare strategy to an extent that some would argue 
amounts to a “weaponisation of information”3 and of social media. Before the 
European elections in May 2019, the fear of disinformation and external interference 
disrupting the ballot was bigger than ever, raising the question whether the EU is ready 
to fight a battle in the so-called ‘information warfare’.  
 
Even though disinformation is not a new phenomenon, governments and international 
organisations as well as the European Union have only recently started to deal with 
the issue. Landau argues that “if there is anything we have learned from the Russian 
cyber activity during the Brexit referendum campaign and the 2016 United States (US) 
and 2017 French presidential election campaigns, it is that our cybersecurity 
                                                 
1 K. Panetta, “Gartner top strategic predictions for 2018 and beyond”, 3 October 2017. 
2 European Parliament, Online disinformation and the EU’s response, 24 April 2018. 
3 F. Spildsboel Hansen, Russian hybrid warfare: a study of disinformation, Zürich, Centre for 
Security Studies, 2017. 
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protections are completely unprepared to cope with a disinformation campaign”.4 
This raises the question whether the defensive measures undertaken by the EU so far 
to deal with disinformation are sufficient, or more offensive measures should be taken. 
In other words, to what extent is the EU strategically prepared to counter external 
disinformation campaigns in cyberspace?  
 
Fearing foreign interference in the 2019 European elections, the EU decided to 
accelerate the pace and take more measures to counter external disinformation 
threats. The new EU Action Plan against disinformation unveiled in December 2018 
provides a strong basis. However, there is currently a multiplicity of actors dealing with 
disinformation and the EU is lacking an overarching and comprehensive body dealing 
solely with this issue. Moreover, the EU is not ready to cope with the latest 
developments made in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) that will significantly 
impact the way disinformation is done and diffused. Overall, the EU is not entirely 
prepared to counter external disinformation campaigns in cyberspace.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. First, the features of disinformation and the reasons 
why it is a security challenge will be presented. It will be shown how cyberspace, social 
media and AI change the way disinformation is spread and perceived; followed by 
an explanation why it should be considered as a cybersecurity matter. The subsequent 
section will be dedicated to Russian disinformation and the EU’s tools and mechanisms 
to deal with it. The last part of the paper will assess the EU’s actions so far and their 
limits. Finally, the future challenges posed by disinformation and some policy 
recommendations will be presented.  
 
Disinformation: a security threat in cyberspace 
Before analysing the EU’s actions regarding disinformation, it is important to 
understand what disinformation is, its features and its consequences. The European 
Commission conceives of disinformation as “verifiably false or misleading information 
that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally 
deceive the public, and may cause public harm”.5 This definition is appropriate for this 
paper because it is rather narrow and specifically underlines the negative intentions 
of disinformation. 
 
                                                 
4 S. Landau, “Cybersecurity: time for a new definition”, Lawfare, 12 January 2018. 
5 European Commission & High Representative, Action Plan against disinformation, JOIN(2018) 
36 final, Brussels, 5 December 2018. 
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Online disinformation: an emerging security challenge 
As a first step, disinformation needs to be placed in the broader context of hybrid 
warfare. The European Commission defines ‘hybrid war’ as a mix of “coercive and 
subversive activities, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, 
military, economic, technological), [that] can be used in a coordinated manner by 
state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the 
threshold of formally declared warfare”.6 Online disinformation is considered as a 
hybrid threat and a tool in hybrid warfare. Other tools can be cyberattacks, 
cyberespionage, foreign asset acquisitions, disruption of critical infrastructures (such 
as transport, energy or banking infrastructures), interference in election processes, 
strategic leaks, disruption of communications networks, terrorist acts, etc.  
 
Disinformation is a complex phenomenon which has numerous harmful consequences 
on individuals and on societies. First of all, disinformation disrupts the trust of citizens in 
traditional media. It “undermines the very fundamentals of information and credibility 
that informed debates are supposed to rest upon”.7 People face different false 
narratives which destabilise their sense of certainty about what is happening in world 
affairs. Moreover, disinformation undermines the trust in public authorities and 
institutions. It confuses citizens as to what and whom to believe. It therefore 
undermines democracy, the rule of law and good governance. Bayer et al. argue 
that disinformation violates fundamental human rights: automated dissemination 
mechanisms and the concealed usage of bots violate privacy and human dignity by 
misleading the users.8 It is thus a clear threat to European values which the Union tries 
to promote internally and externally.  
 
Disinformation usually fosters fear, enhances polarisation (i.e. public opinion moving to 
extreme political parties), social divisions and tensions.9 It thus threatens social 
cohesion and in a larger perspective, European unity. Disinformation campaigns often 
implicitly support extremist ideas and carry an EU-critical tone. As a consequence, 
disinformation is also a threat to the EU’s perceived political legitimacy and contributes 
                                                 
6 European Commission & High Representative, Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: 
a European Union response, JOIN(2016) 18 final, Brussels, 6 April 2016.  
7 K. Giles, The next phase of Russian information warfare, NATO: Strategic Communications 
Centre of Excellence, Riga, 2016, p. 7. 
8 J. Bayer et al., Disinformation and propaganda – Impact on the functioning of the rule of law 
in the EU and its Member States, Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union of the 
European Parliament, PE 608.864, Brussels, February 2019, p. 78. 
9 Panel for the Future of Science and Technology, Automated tackling of disinformation, 
European Science-Media Hub, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 624.278, Brussels, 
March 2019, p. 7. 
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to Euroscepticism. All in all, it can be said that disinformation has serious consequences 
that are threatening the security of the EU and its citizens. 
 
Cyberspace, technological innovations and disinformation  
Cyberspace has completely changed the way disinformation is designed, diffused 
and perceived. Before the creation of the Internet, disinformation used to be limited 
to written and printed forms through the press, leaflets, posters, etc. With cyberspace, 
disinformation can be spread anywhere: on the Internet, social media, via 
smartphones, tablets, computers, and so on. Also, disinformation is not just limited to 
written texts anymore but concerns also pictures and videos which can easily be 
modified and falsified. This section will reflect on the changes induced by cyberspace 
and new technologies such as AI. 
 
Since cyberspace has no geographical borders, disinformation campaigns can easily 
spread on the web, from one country to another, and reach a large audience. 
Cyberspace has “low buy-in costs”.10 It means that a person only needs a few 
instruments and resources to create a wide-ranging disinformation campaign online, 
with low risk for the author given that anonymity prevails in cyberspace. Today, social 
media platforms and web search engines have become the major source of 
information for many citizens.11 As a consequence, “billions of users worldwide have 
become targets of online disinformation and propaganda campaigns through these 
online platforms and technology”.12 In cyberspace, the dissemination of 
disinformation is more widespread and its outreach is amplified. 
 
In addition, social networks play a key role in online disinformation. Social media 
platforms are guided by specific algorithms that will display content according to the 
users’ preferences, comforting them in their opinions and beliefs. This is commonly 
called the ‘filter bubble’: social media filter the information that users will see, 
confirming the users’ pre-existing beliefs and stances and trapping them in a sort of 
‘bubble’. This ‘filter bubble’ effect combined with the speed at which information is 
diffused online creates a breeding ground for disinformation campaigns. Also, social 
media and algorithmic dissemination of content “make disinformation spread faster, 
                                                 
10 D. Betz, “Cyberpower in strategic affairs: neither unthinkable nor blessed”, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 5, 2012, p. 694.  
11 K.E. Matsa, L. Silver, E. Shearer & M. Walker, Western Europeans under 30 view news media 
less positively, rely more on digital platforms than older adults, Washington, DC, Pew Research 
Center, 2018. 
12 Panel for the Future of Science and Technology, op cit.  
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reach deeper and be more emotionally charged”.13 Therefore, it can be said that 
social media which were long praised for their power to democratise online 
conversations, may in reality be undermining democracy.  
 
The relationship between cybersecurity and disinformation is not straightforward. 
Indeed, some argue that “cybersecurity is confined to issues of network security, 
cybercrime and hacking, that is to say, problems that can be solved by technological 
means alone”.14 However, this paper argues that cybersecurity and disinformation go 
hand in hand since disinformation is more and more combined with hacking of 
networks or cyberattacks. These attacks “may include targeted intrusions to collect 
sensitive information as a precursor to leaks or tainted leaks, take-over of social media 
accounts, [or] disruption of information technology systems”.15 
 
Hacking can be a means in itself to spread disinformation. As Tucker explains, hacking 
sensitive information is a strategy for disseminating disinformation. The information can 
subsequently be leaked “in either its real form or following manipulation of the hacked 
materials, so as to damage the targets of disinformation campaigns”.16 This technique 
was used in the case of Hillary Clinton’s leaked emails or the so-called Macron Leaks. 
In the first example, the email account of the chairman of Hillary Clinton's 2016 US 
presidential campaign was hacked, releasing confidential emails of the Democratic 
candidate. In the Macron Leaks, the email accounts of five collaborators of 
Emmanuel Macron were hacked during the 2017 French presidential campaign, 
releasing tens of thousands campaign documents and emails online. A lot of the 
documents leaked were modified or fake, including emails from and to people who 
did not exist. In both cases, researchers have linked the attacks with ‘Fancy Bear’, an 
entity related to the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU).17 These two instances 
demonstrate that disinformation is a cybersecurity problem.  
 
In addition, the development of AI leads to a paradox: on the one hand, AI brings 
enormous opportunities for progress in a wide range of sectors. But on the other hand, 
AI has a significant impact on online disinformation and poses serious risks. Indeed, AI 
                                                 
13 C. Bjola, “Propaganda in the digital age”, Global Affairs, vol. 3, no. 3, 2017, pp. 189-191.  
14 T. Stark, “The interplay between Russian disinformation and hacking”, Politico, 18 December 
2018. 
15 European Commission, Action Plan against disinformation, op. cit., p. 3.  
16 J.A. Tucker et al., Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: A review of 
the scientific literature, New York, Hewlett Foundation, 2018, p. 31. 
17 N. Popescu & S. Secrieru (eds.), Hacks, leaks and disruptions - Russian cyber strategies, Paris, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2018, p. 87.  
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can be used for the purpose of disinformation in several ways: it can help target 
specific audiences notably through algorithms; it can create false narratives and 
digital content of any kind (e.g. video, sound); it amplifies the diffusion of 
disinformation campaigns through bots and trolls. These methods are part of a so-
called “computational propaganda”,18 which refers to the use of algorithms and bots 
to diffuse false information over social networks.  
 
The algorithms used on search platforms and on social media can be a driver for 
spreading disinformation. AI can manipulate the algorithms used for ranking research 
requests so that websites or news articles containing disinformation will appear first. 
The algorithms directing the searches are rarely transparent which makes it very 
difficult to understand how the search ranking has been done. Furthermore, algorithms 
on social media will personalise the social feed of users so that they see what they 
prefer. These algorithms will also facilitate “the sharing of personalised content among 
like-minded users, [which] indirectly heighten[s] polarisation and strengthen[s] the 
effects of disinformation”.19 The same algorithms can also display targeted advertising 
that can be used to promote and monetise online disinformation.  
 
Moreover, AI enables the creation of so-called ‘deep fakes’ through an “AI-based 
technique that combines and superimposes existing images and videos to fake what 
a person is doing or saying”.20 Although manipulation of digital content on computers 
is nothing new, “in the past that manipulation has almost always been detectable”.21 
However, current AI technology allows to create fake videos which seem very 
authentic, making it difficult for the human eye to detect the fraud. Thanks to deep 
learning, “the algorithms that generate the fakes continuously learn how to more 
effectively replicate the appearance of reality, [therefore] deep fakes cannot easily 
be detected by other algorithms”.22 Deep fakes represent a considerable threat since 
they look very credible and are very hard to verify. They can, for instance, give the 
impression that a politician has said or done something that he/she did not do or say. 
It becomes difficult to distinguish between what is real and what is fake, plunging 
people into a ‘science-fiction world’. 
 
                                                 
18 Tucker et al., op. cit., p. 23. 
19 European Commission, Tackling online disinformation: a European approach, COM(2018) 
236 final, Brussels, 26 April 2018, p. 5. 
20 M. Ciobanu, “The challenges and opportunities of using artificial intelligence to tackle 
misinformation”, Journalism.co.uk, 14 April 2018. 
21 C. Meserole & A. Polyakova, “Disinformation wars”, Foreign Policy, 25 May 2018. 
22 Ibid. 
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This section has showed that cyberspace and social media are a game-changer for 
disinformation campaigns, which can circulate more easily and reach a larger 
audience than before. It has also been argued that disinformation should be 
considered as a cybersecurity issue. Moreover, continuous progress in AI is likely to 
affect the way disinformation is created and diffused. The proliferation of AI 
technologies raises serious concerns about their applicability and whether they are 
always used for a good purpose. 
 
Information warfare: Russian disinformation campaigns in the EU 
Russia is not the only player in the disinformation realm but it is by far the most active 
in Europe and frequently uses hybrid warfare tools to destabilise Western countries. 
Barbière speaks of a “war of disinformation waged by the Kremlin”.23 This section will 
present Russia’s strategies, its goals and the particular characteristics of its 
disinformation campaigns.  
 
Russia actively uses digital media (such as social media, Youtube) and modern 
technology to diffuse false narratives, which are cheap tools to reach a large 
audience regardless of geographical borders.24 Today, “the Russian political 
leadership is highly conscious of the power of information as a tool in the sphere of 
security” and hybrid warfare.25 The Russian Defence Minister, Sergey Shoigu, 
acknowledged in 2017 “that a dedicated information warfare force had been 
established in 2013 within the Ministry of Defence”.26 Disinformation is part of the official 
military doctrine of Russia and is an accepted tool of its foreign policy. The country 
invests more than a billion euros per year in its information warfare capabilities.27 
 
While Russia’s disinformation was initially targeting its ‘near abroad’, i.e. former Soviet 
republics like Ukraine or Georgia, Russia has now expanded its outreach beyond the 
former borders of the Soviet Union. Russia primarily targets EU member states and the 
US, and appears to be more and more active in Latin America and Africa as well.28 
The campaigns are addressed to “ordinary citizens, politicians and other public 
                                                 
23 C. Barbière, “Russia: Master of information manipulation”, EurActiv, 11 September 2018.  
24 Interview with EEAS official 2, Brussels, 15 March 2019. 
25 M. Hellman & C. Wagnsson, “How can European states respond to Russian information 
warfare? An analytical framework”, European Security, vol. 26, no. 2, 2017, p. 155. 
26 N. Bentzen, Disinformation, 'fake news' and the EU's response, European Parliamentary 
Research Service, PE 614.584, Brussels, November 2017. 
27 L. Andrikiene, “We still need East StratCom against Kremlin trolls”, EUObserver, 7 June 2018. 
28 Interview with EEAS official 1, Brussels, 28 February 2019. 
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figures”.29 A relevant point is that Russia targets audiences on both sides of political 
and social debates. For instance, in the context of the 2016 US elections, Russian 
disinformation was aimed at politicians and supporters of both sides of the political 
spectrum (Republicans and Democrats).30 
 
Russia deploys an orchestrated strategy of information manipulation, that is 
characterised by “the absence of any moral or ethical constraints”.31 The Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service described Russian disinformation as “universal, flexible, 
smart and borderless”.32 One key technique is the so-called “4D-approach”: “dismiss 
any negative reporting, distort the facts, distract by launching accusations elsewhere, 
and spread dismay”.33  
 
Two main entities that convey Russian narratives and disinformation are the media 
channel RT (formerly known as Russia Today) and the news agency Sputnik. Taken 
together, RT and Sputnik operate in almost 40 languages34 and use a wide range of 
digital tools (websites, social media, videos, etc.). Both present themselves as 
“independent, alternative voices”35 but in reality that means “pro-Russian, conspiracy 
theoretical and anti-Western”. 36 None of them publish articles critical of Putin’s regime. 
Furthermore, many Russian-sourced stories that are first published by RT or Sputnik are 
then amplified by bots and trolls on Twitter and Facebook “causing algorithms to trend 
misleading or false reports that then could be picked up by mainstream news 
coverage”.37 Russia uses trolls on a massive scale, in so-called ‘troll farms’ or ‘troll 
factories’. One example is the ‘Internet Research Agency (IRA)’, a troll factory in Saint-
Petersburg financed by the Kremlin.38 It employs hundreds of people creating fake 
                                                 
29 J. Aro, “The cyberspace war: propaganda and trolling as warfare tools”, European View, no. 
15, 2016, p. 124. 
30 Interview with GMF official, Brussels, 15 March 2019.  
31 Who said what? The security challenges of modern disinformation, Ottawa, Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service, 2018, p. 26. 
32 Ibid., p. 33. 
33 G.H. Karlsen, “Tools of Russian influence: information and propaganda”, in J.H. Matlary & T. 
Heier (eds.), Ukraine and beyond: Russia’s strategic security challenge to Europe, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 185.  
34 Ibid., p. 199. 
35 N. MacFarquhar, “A powerful Russian weapon: the spread of false stories”, The New York 
Times, 28 August 2016. 
36 Aro, op. cit., p. 125. 
37 G.F. Treverton et al., Addressing hybrid threats, Stockholm, Swedish Defence University, 2018, 
p. 47. 
38 J.-B. Jeangene Vilmer, A. Escorcia, M. Guillaume & J. Herrera, “Information manipulation, a 
challenge for our democracies”, Policy Planning Staff (French Ministry of Europe and Foreign 
Affairs) & the Institute for Strategic Research (French Ministry for the Armed Forces), Paris, 2018, 
p. 84. 
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accounts, writing posts, commenting on them to amplify the narratives on social 
media and influence conversations on political issues around the world.  
 
Contrary to what one could think, Russian disinformation is not always about fake 
information. It is often built around an “element of truth”,39 but the information is 
manipulated in a way, often using biased rhetorical questions, that will disturb the 
reader and make him or her doubt the facts. This characteristic makes Russian 
disinformation even more difficult to defeat.  
 
Furthermore, the so-called ‘decoy flare’ technique is distinctive of Russian 
disinformation. The expression comes from the military: in order to confuse 
approaching heat-seeking missiles, military planes will release a lot of false heat 
targets. When applied to disinformation, this method implies that not only one 
alternative truth will be diffused but a large variety of different messages will be 
spread. So many different narratives will be sent out that it will eventually confuse 
people. Finally, Russia views disinformation in the broader picture of information or 
hybrid warfare. It will therefore combine disinformation campaigns with more 
aggressive tools such as cyberattacks or hacking of networks, as was the case for the 
Macron Leaks.   
 
The EU’s strategy to counter external disinformation campaigns 
The 2019 European elections were an important driver for the EU to act as quickly and 
as efficiently as possible to counter external disinformation campaigns. This section will 
focus on the EU’s action tools to deal with and counter the disinformation campaigns 
from abroad. To this end, it will first introduce the EU’s general approach and then look 
at three strands of its action: debunking disinformation, working with online platforms 
and improving cyber capabilities.  
 
The EU’s general approach to fight disinformation 
While Russian disinformation has been going on for several decades,40 the EU has only 
started to take measures in 2015 with the creation of the East StratCom Task Force 
(ESTF). But even at that time, disinformation was not on top of the political agenda.41 
                                                 
39 Interview with EEAS official 2, Brussels, 15 March 2019. 
40 H. Romerstein, “Disinformation as a KGB weapon in the Cold War”, Journal of Intelligence 
History, vol. 1, no. 1, 2001, p. 54.  
41 A. Bernstein, Not Russian to do anything? The EU response to strategic narratives and 
disinformation in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Master’s thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 
2017, p. 25.  
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There was not much enthusiasm to deal with this issue within the EU institutions. 
Bernstein argues that, at that time, disinformation was not perceived as a threat and 
was not taken as seriously as it should have been: “the EU’s perception of this threat is 
not commensurate with the scale of the problem it is facing”.42 An official interviewed 
at the European External Action Service (EEAS) also had a similar argument saying that 
“there was not much political support from within the EEAS and from the High 
Representative to deal with disinformation”.43 Most of the people working at the ESTF 
were seconded national experts. Nevertheless, one can really witness the change of 
will within the EU institutions since the end of 2016, beginning of 2017. All the people 
interviewed for this paper agreed on the fact that the 2016 US elections was a wake-
up call for the EU and a turning point in its course of action to tackle disinformation. 
Moreover, the prospect of having the same scenario (i.e. external interference and 
hacking) happening during the European elections was frightening enough that the 
EU institutions were rushing to implement measures during the first semester of 2019. 
This change of vision is reflected in the choice of words used by the European 
Commission in its official publications. While the word ‘urgent’ has not been employed 
once in the conclusions of the European Council establishing the ESTF in 2015,44 it was 
used five times in the Action Plan published in December 2018,45 for example: “It is 
urgent to step up efforts to secure free and fair democratic processes”;46 or “This calls 
for urgent and immediate action to protect the Union, its institutions and its citizens 
against disinformation”.47 
 
The overall approach of the EU to counter disinformation is rather defensive than 
offensive, meaning that the EU is mostly responding to disinformation campaigns 
rather than preventing them. More precisely, the EU is developing its capacities for 
sense-making and meaning-making. Sense-making means making sense of a 
situation, “sifting through relevant information, building an accurate picture of what is 
happening, and communicating that analysis to political decision-makers”.48 
Meaning-making is linked to communicating about the crisis to the public. Indeed, the 
EU tries to make sense of disinformation campaigns, analyse them and explain them 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p. 11. 
43 Interview with EEAS official 1, Brussels, 28 February 2019. 
44 European Council, European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) – Conclusions, EUCO 
11/15, Brussels, 20 March 2015. 
45 European Commission, Action Plan against disinformation, op. cit., pp. 2, 3, 4, 8, 12. 
46 Ibid., p. 2. 
47 Ibid., p. 4 [emphasis added]. 
48 A. Boin et al., Making sense of sense-making: the EU’s role in collecting, analysing, and 
disseminating information in times of crisis, Stockholm, The Swedish National Defence College, 
2014, p. 5. 
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to the public. A large part of the EU’s work turns around debunking disinformation and 
issuing positive strategic communication. The latter means that the EU tries to better 
communicate within the Union, i.e. to create “persuasive messaging […] allowing 
citizens to easily understand that political and economic reforms promoted by the EU 
can, over time, have a positive impact on their daily lives”,49 but also better 
communicate in the EU’s neighbourhood, including Russia. Bjola argues that “there is 
therefore a clear ideological dimension to countering Russian influence: the goal is to 
contain the threat by developing resilience through the soft power of values and 
ideals”.50 A multiplicity of entities is currently dealing with this issue at the EU level, 
namely: the EEAS, the Strategic Communication Task Forces (including the ESTF), the 
EU Intelligence Centre (INTCEN), the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell (located within INTCEN), or 
the Commission’s Directorate-Generals Connect, Near, Home and Just. 
 
The Action Plan published in December 2018 outlines the EU’s strategy and the path it 
needs to take to tackle disinformation. The EU proposes multidimensional and long-
term measures. However, when reading the document thoroughly, one can see that 
a lot of measures are taken with the short-term perspective of the European elections. 
The Plan draws particular attention to the fact that “exposing disinformation in 
countries neighbouring the Union is complementary to tackling the problem within the 
Union”.51 The EU wants to foster cooperation in the Eastern and Southern 
neighbourhood and in the Western Balkans. As for financial resources, the European 
Commission pledged to increase its budget dedicated to fight disinformation from 1,9 
million to 5 million euros in 2019, compared to Russia’s 1,1 billion euros per year. The 
Action Plan also commits to increase the staff and resources of the ESTF.   
 
Based on the arguments presented in this section, it can be concluded that, so far, 
the EU has responded with a defensive strategy against a very offensive and 
aggressive Russian rhetoric. 
 
Debunking Russian disinformation 
Among the EU’s tools to deal with Russian narratives, the East StratCom Task Force is 
one of the most efficient and promising. Complementary to the efforts of the ESTF, the 
EU tries to promote societal resilience and media literacy.  
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The ESTF is located within the EEAS and is currently composed of fifteen people. The 
work of the task force is based on the Council mandate of March 2015, limiting its work 
to the Kremlin’s disinformation. It operates with a small budget of 1,1 million euros since 
January 2018. Its motto is “Don’t be deceived: question even more” in reference to 
RT’s own motto “Question more”. The work of the task force is divided into three main 
tasks: debunking disinformation, providing positive strategic communication in the 
countries of the Eastern Partnership, and communicating in Russian language.52 
Debunking disinformation consists of fact-checking (i.e. verifying the trustworthiness of 
an information) and analysing and translating Russian pieces of information. The ESTF 
maintains a database of false narratives disseminated by Russia which currently 
contains 5000 cases registered since 2015. The work of the task force can be accessed 
through its Internet website ‘EU vs Disinfo’, updated daily, and its weekly 
‘Disinformation Review’.53 The latter highlights the latest cases of Russian 
disinformation, in an easy-to-understand manner and a light tone in order to reach a 
vast range of people. As for the strategic communication part, the ESTF tries to convey 
positive messages about the EU in the Eastern neighbouring countries, including Russia. 
For instance, the task force did a campaign in Russian language about the benefits of 
Erasmus+.54  
 
In parallel to teams of professionals checking disinformation stories, it is equally 
important to give the keys to citizens to debunk false information themselves. Bjola 
calls it “digital containment”.55 For that purpose, the 2018 Action Plan rightly focuses 
on ‘societal resilience’, i.e. giving citizens the means to be able to sort out true and 
false information, to encourage them to question what they read and see, and to 
strengthen their critical spirit. It is interesting to note that the precise term ‘societal 
resilience’ is used for the first time in the Action Plan while the communication of April 
2018 only refers to ‘resilience’. Why this focus on societal resilience at this point in time? 
The citizens that are reading disinformation online are also the ones that were voting 
in the European elections in May 2019. It was thus crucial from the perspective of the 
EU institutions to give them the keys to distinguish between real and fake information.  
 
                                                 
52 Interview with EEAS official 2, Brussels, 15 March 2019. 
53 https://euvsdisinfo.eu 
54 EEAS, New opportunities for Russian students and academic staff to study, teach and train in 
Europe, 24 October 2018. 
55 Bjola & Pamment, op. cit. 
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Combatting disinformation with the help of online platforms and cyber tools  
With the rise of online disinformation especially on social media, the EU understood 
that it needs to include platforms in the fight against disinformation. This is easier said 
than done, knowing the platforms’ reluctance to open their private data and the 
financial benefits they get from advertisement, including political and biased 
advertisement that can promote false information. Moreover, since disinformation is 
more and more combined with cyberattacks of all kinds, tackling disinformation 
means also strengthening cyber tools. This section thus analyses the EU’s policies in the 
realm of online platforms and cyber issues together.  
 
As already mentioned, social media and web search platforms play a key role in 
transmitting and amplifying disinformation. Therefore, fighting disinformation requires 
close cooperation with them. To this end, a working group of the multi-stakeholder 
forum on online disinformation drafted a Code of Practice on disinformation.56 This 
Code of Practice was signed by Google, Mozilla, Facebook, Twitter, as well as eight 
trade associations (e.g. European Association of Communication Agencies, European 
Digital Media Association) in September 2018. The Code of Practice is non-binding 
and is part of a self-regulating approach. The signatories are required to submit a 
regular report assessing their progress in implementing the Code. The first 
implementation report was published in January 2019 by the four Internet giants. Until 
May 2019, the platforms had to publish an intermediate monitoring report every month 
to see how they implemented the actions that are “the most relevant and urgent to 
ensure the integrity of elections, namely: scrutiny of ad placements; political and issue-
based advertising; and integrity of services”.57 Despite some encouraging 
advancements, the Commission laments the fact that the platforms struggle to 
transmit enough data and metrics to clearly measure the results of the activities 
undertaken, especially with the scrutiny of ad placements.58 A general assessment of 
the implementation of the Code of Practice will be undertaken at the end of 2019. If 
not enough progress will have been made, the Commission may move towards a 
more assertive approach and propose regulation. 
 
                                                 
56 European Commission, EU Code of Practice on disinformation, Brussels, 26 September 2018.  
57 European Commission, Statement on the Code of Practice against disinformation: 
Commission asks online platforms to provide more details on progress made, 
STATEMENT/19/1379, Brussels, 28 February 2019. 
58 Ibid. 
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The EU has been criticised for its decision to privilege a self-regulating approach.59 
There are no incentives for the platforms to apply the measures. A report done at the 
request of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology of the European 
Parliament outlined that “social platforms may prioritise addressing certain issues 
which may not necessarily be the most important ones from disinformation 
containment perspective”.60 There is a  discrepancy between the platforms’ actions 
and the EU’s expectations. The EU urged the platforms to act before May 2019 but one 
might wonder whether it is not too much to ask for in such a short period of time. 
 
Taking measures to counter disinformation goes hand in hand with improving 
cybersecurity protection. The EU’s actions in cyber are, as in the case of disinformation, 
defensive rather than offensive. Two strands can be distinguished: measures to 
prepare actors and infrastructures for possible cyberattacks (i.e. prevention and 
deterrence), coupled with measures to improve resilience and ‘punish’ the 
perpetrators of cyberattacks (i.e. sanctions). The document guiding the EU’s actions 
in cyber is the 2013 “EU cyber security strategy: an open, safe and secure 
cyberspace”.61 The first EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity is the Directive on the 
Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS) adopted in 2016 (member states 
should have transposed it in their national legislation by now).62 Its aim is to achieve 
“evenly high level of security of network and information systems across the EU”.63 
More recently, the European Parliament adopted the Cybersecurity Act in March 2019 
that will give a permanent mandate and more resources to the European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and will issue an EU-wide 
certification framework for information and communication technologies in order to 
harmonise cybersecurity standards for products and services. This is a step in the right 
direction.64  
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During the European Council of October 2018, restrictive measures (i.e. cyber 
sanctions) to respond to and deter cyberattacks were discussed.65 They would be part 
of a so-called ‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’ and would target “individual hackers as well 
as state-linked groups with commercial bans and financial restrictions”.66 These 
sanctions are currently being discussed within the EU institutions. Yet, some questions 
remain open: how severe should a cyberattack be to merit sanctions? How to apply 
sanctions given the difficulty to identify the perpetrators of cyberattacks? Many 
countries lack capabilities for cyber forensics to identify state-sponsored hacker 
groups and “others lack the political will to call out their sponsors”.67 
 
In addition, the EU is trying to help member states improve their cyber resilience. In this 
field, ENISA is a key actor. The agency has set up the ‘Partnership for Resilience’ in 
2011, which provides the guidelines for public-private sector cooperation and 
encourages member states to collaborate with the private sector. Cyber resilience, 
like the concept of societal resilience discussed previously, is linked to the concept of 
cyber hygiene. The latter implies teaching citizens safe behaviour in cyberspace. To 
this end, ENISA released a “Review of cyber hygiene practices” in 2016.68 
 
This section gave an oversight of the different tools that the EU is using to combat 
online disinformation. The Union is developing its capabilities to debunk disinformation, 
improving cybersecurity and attempting to cooperate with online platforms. It has 
stepped up its efforts in view of the European elections 2019. Most of the measures are 
still at an embryonic stage, the ESFT being one of the most developed and well-
functioning ones. How successful has the EU been so far in strategically countering 
external disinformation campaigns in cyberspace? 
 
Assessment of the EU’s actions and reflection on the future of disinformation 
This section will first address the limits of the EU’s actions to fight disinformation. Then, 
the future challenges posed by disinformation will be scrutinised, before finishing with 
some recommendations on how the EU can improve its policy in this field. 
 
 
                                                 
65 European Council, European Council meeting (18 October 2018) – Conclusions, EUCO 13/18, 
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The limits of the EU’s actions  
Despite good initiatives, the EU’s strategy is facing some pitfalls. One major criticism 
that was highlighted by an EEAS official is that the EU is acting too late and “too little 
in comparison to the means deployed by Russia”.69 Some observers like Bendiek and 
Schulze are considering the strategic task forces and the Action Plan as mere short-
term solutions.70  
 
The European elections of May 2019 prompted the EU to treat the fight against 
disinformation as a top priority. Yet, this was not the case among all member states. 
An EEAS official admitted that “the political will among member states to do 
something about disinformation is here, but the will to do a lot is not here since there is 
no common vision of disinformation being a threat”.71 Indeed, all 28 member states 
do not equally perceive false information as being a menace. This is particularly 
relevant when talking about Russian disinformation. Some member states, because of 
their past relations with the Soviet Union, are much more aware of the threat and 
much more willing to deal with it. This lack of a common vision has been 
acknowledged by the European Parliament which has expressed its concerns about 
“the limited awareness amongst some of [the EU’s] member states that they are 
audiences and arenas of propaganda and disinformation”.72 Some member states 
also think that the EU is not the best forum to tackle disinformation.73  
 
The think tank European Values ranked the EU member states according to their 
perception of Russian disinformation and the measures they implemented to counter 
it.74 This study shows that the countries that have already been victims of Russian 
interference are keener to act, for instance France (Macron Leaks), the Baltic states 
(past history with Russia) or the United Kingdom (interference in Brexit referendum, 
Skripal case).75 In short, the member states’ approach to disinformation depends on 
the national context, their capabilities and, most importantly, their willingness to deal 
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with it. Because there is such a variation in the member states’ engagement, the EU is 
lacking strong political support to act.  
 
Furthermore, there is an important discrepancy between the level of threat posed by 
disinformation and the EU’s allocated resources to fight it. The budget does not 
represent accurately the scale of the problem, all the more when compared to the 
resources deployed by Russia. RT, Sputnik and other sources invest more than 1,1 billion 
euros a year to support pro-Kremlin propaganda. The Russian troll factory in Saint-
Petersburg counts around 1000 full-time employees.76 These numbers compared to the 
five million euros that the EU plans to allocate to disinformation still “leaves the EU on 
the weaker side [of this] asymmetric information warfare”.77 The small team of the ESTF 
will hardly have sufficient capabilities (in terms of human resources and technical 
material) to analyse big data. The task force is also “too dependent on the goodwill 
and financial contributions of member states”.78 It therefore needs stronger political 
commitment from the member states and more investments. The financial resources 
allocated to cyber are also poor when compared to other big actors: ENISA has an 
annual budget of 11 million euros while the US plans to spend 17,4 billion dollars for 
cybersecurity in 2020.79  
 
Moreover, the fact that there are so many different entities at the EU level dealing with 
disinformation can also be a major drawback because it reduces efficiency. Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) have troubles knowing whom to talk to: which 
DG? Which person in the EEAS? A representative from a civil society organisation 
interviewed for this study explained that this problem of fragmentation also exists at 
the member states’ level and that it is difficult to know whom to contact (who deals 
with disinformation at a national level: Ministry of Justice? Ministry of Foreign Affairs?).80 
Nevertheless, an interviewee from the EEAS thinks that this fragmentation can also 
have a positive side as all the different entities have different points of view that can 
complement each other.81 
 
                                                 
76 S. Solton, “EU Commission takes aim at disinformation, admits funding deficit”, EurActiv, 6 
December 2018. 
77 E. Chivot, The fight against online disinformation calls for concerted approaches to European 
policymaking, Brussels, Centre For Data Innovation, 18 February 2019. 
78 C. Mortera-Martinez, “What is Europe doing to fight disinformation?”, CER Bulletin, no. 123, 
London, Centre for European Reform, January 2019. 
79 The White House, “Cybersecurity Funding” in A budget for a better America: Fiscal year 2020 
- Budget of the U.S. government, Washington, DC, 2019, pp. 305-310.  
80 Interview with a representative from a civil society organisation, Brussels, 20 February 2019.  
81 Interview with EEAS official 1, Brussels, 28 February 2019. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2019 
 21 
In addition, the current EU approach to deal with disinformation is focusing too little on 
AI and cyber capabilities. The development of AI will produce more performant and 
innovative bots to create and diffuse disinformation campaigns online. The possibilities 
that technology offers to generate more real and difficult-to-detect deep fakes seem 
endless. The EU is ill-prepared for this new wave of technology: Meserole and 
Polyakova argue that “the EU’s measures are still designed to target the disinformation 
of yesterday rather than that of tomorrow”.82  
 
In addition, most of the current and upcoming Horizon 2020 projects on disinformation 
are dealing with fact-checking and only a few with AI and other new technologies. 
The future programme Horizon Europe allocates an important part of its resources to 
AI for the health, agriculture and transportation sectors but not directly to AI related 
to disinformation. Another problem is that technology advances far more quickly than 
regulation and policies. By the time the EU will have effectively implemented all its 
measures on disinformation, another wave of technological development will have 
brought new ways of artificially-created false information and will have made 
legislation obsolete in no time. 
 
Lastly, the EU does not have a strategy that clearly associates cybersecurity and 
disinformation. It is also difficult for the EU to act in this field for the simple reason that it 
has few legal competences: cybersecurity governance remains the responsibility of 
the member states. As in the case of disinformation, AI will also impact cybersecurity: 
cyberattacks will be more powerful and more disruptive thanks to increasingly 
innovative and powerful tools. Some authors argue that a digital Geneva convention 
on cybersecurity is necessary as “the transnational nature of the web renders all 
unilateral attempts of protection illusory”.83 A global digital governance would give a 
common definition of what is truly a cyberattack and would also state how severe a 
cyberattack should be to merit sanctions. In the case of the EU and its ‘cyber 
diplomacy toolbox’, a global digital governance would facilitate the adoption of 
cyber sanctions. An EEAS official agreed that “a Geneva digital convention would 
certainly help and would ease the adoption of EU measures but the lack of it does not 
prevent the EU to act”.84 
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Disinformation never sleeps: future challenges  
Disinformation is a moving phenomenon. This paper has already underlined how AI will 
impact disinformation and will represent an enormous challenge for the EU if it does 
not take the right measures to adapt its strategy to technological innovations. This 
section outlines other challenges that the EU is likely to meet in the future.  
 
Decentralised applications are still at a nascent stage but are likely to increase in the 
future. Decentralised applications store data on a decentralised blockchain and are 
not controlled by a single authority. Because they are decentralised, it is very difficult 
to track the accounts on these applications back to real-life individuals or 
organisations. Moreover, once information is submitted to a decentralised application, 
it is nearly impossible to take down. Therefore, these applications present an 
unprecedented challenge as content is impossible to remove. If governments and civil 
society can currently appeal to online platforms to “block or remove a malicious user 
or problematic content on social networks”, with decentralised applications, this will 
be almost impossible since “there will not always be someone to turn to”.85  
 
Recently, two additional strategic task forces have been set up alongside the ESTF: 
the Western Balkans StratCom Task Force (to counter Russian disinformation in the 
region) and the South StratCom Task Force (to counter Islamic State terrorist 
organisation propaganda in North Africa and the Middle East). Yet, none of these task 
forces focuses on the emerging actors that might disrupt Western democracies 
through disinformation and cyberattacks even more than Russia. China and Iran are 
indeed two examples of countries whose strategies are becoming more and more 
offensive with regard to meddling in Western societies. China is known to use 
disinformation, cyberattacks and espionage to further its interests in Europe.86 Similar 
to Russia, China uses a bot-driven computational propaganda, but disseminates 
positive and non-threatening narratives rather than aggressive ones like Russia. China 
usually diffuses “biased stories to promote the ‘Chinese dream’ as unfailingly positive 
and advantageous for the world at large”.87 What is more, China has a huge potential 
in the realm of AI technologies, which makes it even more threatening for Europe. 
Some experts argue that China is “now ahead of Russia as the most prolific nation-
state mounting attacks on firms, universities, government departments, think tanks and 
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NGOs” in the West.88 Alongside China, Iran is also very active in disseminating 
disinformation campaigns in the EU. The narratives diffused by Iran mostly deal with 
current European governments which are depicted as “failures, depraved and 
undeserving”.89 Its main objective is to influence people’s opinion and “turn them 
against governments that do not support Iran or the Iranian regime”.90 
 
Underneath Russia’s disinformation campaigns within the EU lies an even more 
complex problem: the links between the Russian Federation and European far-right 
movements. An EEAS official admitted that “the damage is already done”91 through 
the long-standing relationship Russia has forged with some extreme right-wing parties 
in the EU. In line with its aim to destabilise the West, Russia tries to support political forces 
in Europe that have the same objective of disrupting Western unity. In some cases, 
Russia finances these parties. One of the most blatant examples is Russia’s link with the 
French far-right party the ‘Rassemblement National’ led by Marine Le Pen. In 2014, the 
party received a loan of nine million euros from the First Czech-Russian Bank in 
Moscow.92 More recently, Matteo Salvini, Deputy Prime Minister of Italy and Minister of 
the Interior, has been accused to have received three million euros from the Kremlin 
to finance the campaign of his party for the European elections.93 It can be said that 
the Russian Federation has secured “a predominantly loyal political structure at the 
heart of European democracy”.94 Having this in mind, disinformation and 
cyberattacks do not seem as the most worrying issues right now.   
 
Moreover, there is a growing number of European politicians (especially from the 
extreme right) that bring up false information during political debates, interviews or 
speeches.95 Some use disinformation as a “means of political campaign”.96 Therefore, 
internal disinformation campaigns can to a certain extent be even more dangerous 
than the external ones.  
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At this point in time, no foreign interference in the 2019 European elections has been 
detected. The European Commission reports that “available evidence has not 
allowed to identify a distinct cross-border disinformation campaign from external 
sources specifically targeting the European elections. However, the evidence 
collected revealed a continued and sustained disinformation activity by Russian 
sources aiming to suppress turnout and influence voter preferences”.97 Based on these 
findings, some policy recommendations for the EU can be proposed. 
 
Ways forward: policy recommendations  
All the following suggestions have a common point: they call for a ‘whole-of-
government’, a ‘whole-of-society’ and a ‘whole-of-EU’ approach. Indeed, the fight 
against disinformation requires a variety of actors to work together: policy-makers, 
social media platforms, journalists, the educational community, cybersecurity 
specialists, data scientists, AI researchers, political and social scientists, NGOs, etc.  
 
AI has a darker and a brighter side. On the one hand, AI tools can act as amplifiers for 
disinformation but on the other hand, they can also help to detect and analyse false 
narratives. With the massive flow of information that circulates online on a daily basis, 
it becomes almost impossible for small teams of fact-checkers like the ESTF to detect 
false information all by themselves. Therefore, AI can be very helpful in identifying 
hostile narratives and analysing big data. AI can be used to detect and flag narratives: 
it can find “words or even patterns of words that can throw light on fake stories […] 
[since] AI makes it easy to learn behaviours, possible through pattern recognition”.98 
AI can suggest to users media outlets and reporting “outside of their echo chambers, 
thus opening their eyes to a broader range of viewpoints”.99 AI can also be used to 
determine the authenticity of a website by creating a machine-learning model. 
Nevertheless, it is important to underline that AI tools need to be combined with 
human verification. For instance, algorithms can make mistakes (i.e. censoring 
accurate and true information). Human oversight is therefore needed to contextualise 
information and to verify algorithms. It was suggested that the best way forward is to 
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“implement human-in-the-loop solutions, where people are assisted by machine 
learning and AI methods, but not replaced”.100 
 
A key recommendation for the EU is to dedicate significant financial resources to 
research and development at the intersection of disinformation and AI. Most of the 
projects funded by the EU are either related to disinformation or to AI but very few 
combine both issues. The next Horizon Europe and Digital Europe programmes should 
therefore have calls for projects directly combining disinformation and AI. The research 
should focus on automated methods for detection of false information, detection of 
bots and improving algorithms on searching and social media platforms. Research 
efforts should also be dedicated to better understand decentralised applications and 
their role and impact on disinformation. Also, it is fundamental for researchers to have 
access to data and algorithms to analyse them, understand the patterns of 
disinformation and to find adequate solutions. The EU should find incentives for 
platforms to open their data and make their algorithms completely transparent.  
 
It is essential to continue cataloguing and analysing the tools, techniques and 
intentions of disinformation campaigns. The EU should continue its support for quality 
journalism and fact-checking. It should support national fact-checking initiatives and 
encourage all mainstream media outlets to have specific fact-checking teams. The 
study done at the request of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology of 
the European Parliament also suggested fact-checking to “be crowd-sourced with 
citizens flagging suspicious information which is then checked independently”.101  
 
Moreover, the EU needs to dedicate more financial resources to the fight against 
disinformation. Five million euros is not enough to deal with the complex issue of 
disinformation. An upgraded budget should first benefit the ESTF in order to hire more 
people and to upgrade their AI tools to help them deal with the abundance of 
information and disinformation sources. With the help of a larger team, the 
‘Disinformation Review’ could be diffused on a larger scale and could be translated 
in all EU languages.  
 
In a long-term perspective, raising public awareness on disinformation, promoting 
media literacy and critical thinking among citizens are key measures. The EU Action 
Plan rightly puts the focus on societal resilience beyond elections. The EU should put 
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further efforts in promoting media literacy all over Europe and reach out to citizens 
that are the most vulnerable to disinformation. To this end, collaborating with non-state 
actors such as NGOs running projects on disinformation and local governments is 
essential. It is also important to promote the different tools and resources available to 
help citizens verify pieces of information. Education to media and training to recognise 
true and false information should be mandatory at schools all over the EU. Critical 
thinking should be included in every curriculum.  
 
The EU needs therefore to have a strategy that combines cybersecurity and 
disinformation. While there is a tendency to think in silos and separate cyber issues and 
disinformation, the Macron Leaks showed that Russia has a global vision linking 
cyberattacks, disinformation and election interference. As a first step, Landau 
advocates a new definition of cybersecurity that takes into account disinformation.102 
Likewise, ENISA suggests classifying election systems and infrastructures as critical 
infrastructures. It would oblige “the responsible stakeholders to take the appropriate 
and necessary measures to safeguard their network and information systems to ensure 
a high level of cybersecurity”.103 Furthermore, the EU should dedicate additional 
financial resources to cyber and improve its capabilities in this domain. Collaboration 
with the private sector is key. The EU should develop public-private partnerships on 
cybersecurity: the more communication and coordination between the EU, national 
governments and the private sector, the better.  
 
Lastly, the EU’s efforts to tackle disinformation need to be combined with those of the 
member states. Since cyber governance remains a national competence, it is equally 
important that the member states improve their own cyber capabilities including by 
introducing legislation to tackle the challenges associated with online disinformation. 
 
Conclusion: preparing for the battle 
Disinformation is a multifaceted problem, “it does not have one single root cause, and 
thus does not have one single solution”.104 By focusing on Russian disinformation, this 
paper tried to answer the following question: to what extent is the EU strategically 
prepared to counter external disinformation campaigns in cyberspace? In the run up 
to the European elections in May 2019, the EU was taken by a sense of urgency and 
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accelerated its course of action in order to secure the ballot. The EU Action Plan 
against disinformation published in December 2018 provides a strong basis for action. 
The ESTF is a key asset to detect and debunk false Russian narratives. Measures such 
as the Code of Practice, if well implemented by the platforms, as well as the 
Cybersecurity Act and the prospect of cyber sanctions are promising steps in the right 
direction. However, to be fully prepared to counter external disinformation campaigns 
in cyberspace, substantial additional resources need to be deployed to try to reduce 
the strategic asymmetric gap between the EU and Russia. Also, the Union needs to 
focus more on the latest developments made in the field of AI that will tremendously 
impact the creation and dissemination of disinformation.  
 
Overall, this paper has shown that technological development and social media have 
greatly accelerated the speed at which (false) news are diffused and have expanded 
their reach. It has also demonstrated how social media and AI tools such as algorithms 
and bots affect the way people inform themselves and create their own reality (‘filter 
bubble’ effect). Therefore, it is as important to have experts debunking disinformation 
than to educate citizens to think critically. This paper could serve as a basis for future 
research on Iranian or Chinese disinformation campaigns within the EU or to compare 
Russian disinformation campaigns diffused in the EU with the ones addressed to African 
or Latin American countries.  
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